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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY J. CRAGUN, aka
MRS. RONALD N. CRAGUN,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.
THE BANKERS LIFE COMP ANY,
DES MOINES, IOWA,

Case No.
12750

Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought action as beneficiary of a special
whole life insurance policy issued in response to a claimed
conversion privilege in a group insurance plan. Defendant
refused payment and tendered return of the premium based
upon non-eligibility of alleged insured and misrepresentation and mistake.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff moved the Court to enter judgment on her
behalf in the amount of $10,000.00, plus interest. Defendant
moved for Summary Judgment.
The Court heard oral arguments on October 19, 1971
and admitted in evidence plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, and
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5. On November 19, 1971, the Court entered an Order
granting Summary Judgment in favor of defendant and
denied plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the District Court's
Summary Judgment in favor of defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about December 1, 1964, defendant issued its
Group Life Insurance Policy No. 5376 (hereinafter called
"Group Policy") to the Trustees of Music Operators of
America (hereinafter called MOA). Norman W. Cragun.
doing business as Cragun Music Company, was a member
of MOA by reason of a small coin operated record player
business which he operated out of his home in Ogden, Utah.
He qualified as an "employer member" within the provisions of the said Group Policy. (R. 41, 45, and 65). On or
about March 22, 1966, Ronald N. Cragun, son of Norman
W. Cragun, applied for life insurance coverage under the
group policy and represented himself to be an employee of
Cragun Music Company (R. 41, 54, and 66). Pursuant to
that application the defendant issued to Ronald N. Cragun a
certificate of insurance under the Group Policy which certifkate was in a form admitted by the plaintiff and hereinafter referred to as Certificate No. 185-2. (R. 42, 58-60,
and 66).
The Group Policy and the Certificate No. 185-2 pro\'ided for life insurance for "actively employed employees
of employer members" in the amount of $5,000.00.
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Defendant sent Ronald N. Cragun a notice of termination of the entire Group Policy effective February 28, 1970.
(R. 42, 61 and 66). On March 16, 1970, Ronald N. Cragun
returned his certificate No. 185-2 to the defendant and
requested "conversion to a Special Ordinary Life Insurance
Policy in the amount of $2,000.00." (R. 41, 43, and 65). He
also therein represented that he had terminated his connection with Cragun Music Company on the last day of February, 1970. On or about March 30, 1970, Ronald N. Cragun
submitted an application for conversion to ordinary life in
the amount of $10,000.00. (R. 41, 44 and 65). In said
application Ronald N. Cragun represented that the amount
of his terminated life insurance was $10,000.00. His father,
Norman W. Cragun, signed as "Employer" and the employer's portion of the application stated that Ronald N.
Cragun had last worked on February 28, 1970 and that the
amount of insurance in force under this plan on Ronald on
date of termination was $15,000.00. This application was
attached to the policy issued and upon which plaintiff bases
her claim.
Deposition of Norman W. Cragun taken March 4, 1971,
discloses the following: In his private capacity he did business as Cragun Music Company. (P. 3) As such he didn't
keep a set of books, he had no checking account and no
payroll. (P. 4) He had about ten machines all located in
the Ogden area and would do his own repairs, collect the
moneys and change the records. (P. 6) Ronald N. Cragun
was his son and when needed would assist the father in
repairing the machines if asked or when he was at the
father's home, provided Ronald was free at the time. (P. 7)
Ronald's help was gratis so that if the father needed him
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he wo11ld ask Ronald for his help. (P. 9) If the father ever
gave Ronald money it was because he was his son, not by
way of payment for services. (P. 11) This same relationship persisted from 1964 until June of 1970 when Ronald
died. (P. 12 ,13, and 17) Norman W. Cragun worked at
Hill Field Air Force Base from 1966 on and operated Cragun Music Company on the side. (P. 7 and 14) Ronald
never advised the father that he was ending the relationship
nor did the father ever so advise Ronald. As far as the father was concerned the relationship that persisted throughout 1969 continued up to the date of Ronald's death. (P. 17)
The relationship was the same whether the month was
January, February or March of 1970. If Ronald was an
employee of Cragun Music Company in January 1970, he
was likewise an employee in March and April of 1970 because the relationship remained always the same. There
was not a bit of change. The son never advised the father
that he was going to withhold his services from Cragun
Music Company at any time during 1970. Until he became
ill in June of 1970 Ronald responded as his father had need.
(P. 18 and 19) The father's tax return made no reference
to any payment made to Ronald, he reported no expense
attributed to payroll and never had a withholding statement
for Ronald.
Deposition of Norman W. Cragun taken May 5, 1970
discloses the following: During the first six months of 1970
he put in about 16 hours per week in the operation of Cragun Music Company besides working a forty-hour week at
Hill Field. (P. 3) This was substantially the situation
throughout the year of 1969. During 1969 and the first half
of 1970 the largest portion of the work of Cragun Music
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Company was done by him. (P. 4)
During the first half of 1970 from January through
the time of Ronald's death, the amount of work Ronald
would put in during the week for Cragun Music Company
would vary anywhere from zero hours per week to as many
as twelve hours per week. (P. 7) The father doesn't recall
any weeks during the first half of 1970 that Ronald would
have put in more than twelve hours per week. (P. 8)
Deposition of the plaintiff taken March 4, 1971, disclosed the following: Ronald N. Cragun worked as a full
time insurance salesman for Prudential Insurance Company
prior to 1960. (P. 16) He worked as a full time salesman
for Blue Cross Insurance Company for about seven years
ending in 1965 or 1966. (P. 5) Since leaving Blue Cross
and until the time of his death his full time employment
had been as district manager of the life insurance department of Safeco Insurance Company. (P. 6, 8, and 10)
Plaintiff first noted Ronald's health was deteriorating
about the end of May or the first part of June 1970. (P. 12)
His health appeared to be good in January and February
and remained so right up until the end of May. (P. 13) She
noticed no change in his working or employment status or
work habits including his evening work from January 1970
until the latter part of May or the first part of June. (P. 14)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The case now before this Court primarily involves a
group, rather than an individual, insurance policy. Since
group insurance provides coverage for an often large and
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fluctuating class of persons, rather than for the single insured, since the individual class member is rarely personally
enrolled or contacted by the insurer, and since membership
in the class is almost always a required condition of group
insurance, coverage issues in group insurances cases raise
unique questions of law peculiar to group insurance situations. As as result, such questions are perhaps best considered within the special framework of group insurance law.
In such cases, the more persuasive authorities may be those
addressing themselves specifically to group insurance fact
situations. It should be noted that the Utah Code contains
a specific chapter (Section 31-23-1 et seq.) on group life
insurance policies, which chapter is separate and distinct
from the regular insurance provisions of the Code, and
Section 31-23-15 of that chapter specifically deals with
conversion rights on termination of eligibility.
Respondent's basic theory is, that the individual life
insurance policy which decedent sought to obtain was governed by the eligibility and conversion provisions of the
group policy. Since the decedent was not eligible for membership in the group policy and since he was not eligible to
be insured in the group or to convert that policy, he was
never entitled to obtwin the individual policy and that policy
is void and subject to rescission by defendant-respondent.
The threshold question would seem to be whether the
terms of the group contract continued into the individual
po!ic:v decedent obtained, or at least, whether the terms of
the prior contract governed decedent's ability to receive the
l?.ter polic:v. This court has held that a reinstated insurance
policy is a continuation of the original, rather than a separate, new agreement. Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty
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Co., 24 Utah 2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970). In the Dunken
case cited below the United States Supreme Court held
that a policy issued pursuant to the conversion provisions
of an earlier policy is governed by the terms of the prior
contract.
In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924),
the insurer issued an insured a term life insurance policy
which pursuant to its conversion option was converted
into a life policy by the insured. The prior policy was
cancelled and a new policy bearing a new number was
isssued. The insured received the policy but did not pay the
premiums. Shortly thereafter he died. The insurer claimed
the second policy never became binding and that it was separate and distinct from the earlier policy. The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding and citing with approval a New
York case for the proposition that, the later policy was not
an independent contract, but rather a continuation of the
original. Id. at 395. With respect to the case before it the
Court noted:
The second policy here was issued in pursuance of,
and was dependent for its existence and its terms upon,
the express provisions of the contract contained in the
first one. By those provisions, upon the simple application of the insured, the new policy must issue. Nothing was left to future agreement. The terms of the new
policy were fixed when the original policy was made.
. . . It was issued not as the result of any new negotiation or agreement, but in discharge of pre-existing
obligations. It merely fulfilled promises then outstanding, and did not arise from new or additional promises. Id. at 399-400
And in Burr v. Equitable Life Insurance Co., 84 F.2d
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781 (9th Cir. 1936), the Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a term policy, an application for that policy, and a converted
policy for ordinary life insurance all constituted a single
policy of insurance.
In clear and unambiguous terms the Group Policy
relevant to this action extended its coverage to "actively
employed employees of insured employer members."
Section 1 of the Group Policy provided:
The term "actively employed" means employment
in the Phonographic Music Machines or other coin
operated equipment industry for 15 hours or more per
week.
The terms "active work" and "actively at work,"
as used 'in this Policy with respect to any Person, mean
active full-time performance of all customary duties
of his occupation (for a period of at least fifteen hours
per week) at his usual place of employment. (R. 46)
Section 16 of the group policy provided:
Any person within thirty-one days after
(a) the date his life insurance under this Policy is
terminated because of termination of employment or
of membership in a class or classes eligible for such
insurance under this Policy; or
(b) the date this Policy is terminated, or is amended
to exclude the classification of Persons to which he
belongs, if he has been so insured continuously for at
least five years immediately prior thereto; or
(c) the date his life insurance under Schedule No. 1
under this Policy is reduced by reason of an increase
in age;
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Shall be entitled to have issued to him, without evidence of insurability, an individual policy of life insurance without disability or other supplementary benefits
provided written application therefor and payment of
the first premium thereon is made to the Company
within said thirty-one days. Any such individual policy
issued shall become effective on the thirty-second day
following the applicable date specified in (a), (b) or
(c) above.
If the insurance is terminated as outlined in (a) above,
the Person shall have the right to convert the amount
of life insurance in force on his life as of the date of
such termination, less any amount of insurance in force
on his life pursuant to an application for an individual
policy previously made in accordance with these provisions.
If the insurance is terminated as outlined in (b) above,
the Person shall have the right to convert the smaller
of
(a) the amount of life insurance in force on his life
as of the date of such termination, less any amount for
which he is or becomes eligible under any group life
insurance policy issued or reissued by the Company or
any other insurance carrier within thirty-one days
after such termination date; and
(b) $2,000.00. (R-53).
The evidence is clear that the decedent's employment
did not terminate on February 28, 1970. The decedent's
father and alleged employer stated that decendent didn't
ever tell him he was terminating his employment and that
until June of 1970 decedent helped him with the same frequency that he always had. (Norman Cragun Dep. 3/4/71,
p. 19. See also Norman Cragun Dep. 5/5/71, p. 7.) The
plaintiff, decedent's wife, also testified that she noticed no
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change in decedent's working status or habits from January of 1970 until late May of 1970. (Shirley Jean Cragun
Dep., p. 13-14).
From the foregoing it is evident that decedent did not
terminate his employment on February 28, 1970, and therefore had no right to convert pursuant to Section 16 (a) of
the policy.
It will be recalled that conversion rights under the
group policy had to be exercised within thirty-one days
after employment terminated. Since there is no evidence
that decedent terminated his employment prior to his death
(if he ever was "employed" by his father), the record is
bereft of any termination date and therefore there is no
evidence which would permit plaintiff to rely on the provisions of Section 16 (a) of the group policy.
The provisions in Section 16 (b) are rather complex,
but not ambiguous. They provide that if the group policy
is terminated and if the decedent had been continuously
insured for five years prior to the time the group policy
was terminated, decedent could convert the lesser of
$2,000.00 or the amount of insurance under the group policy
less the amount he became eligible for under another group
policy.
Decedent first applied for membership in the group
policy on or about March 22, 1966. (R-54). The application
was not accepted until May 1, 1966. (Id.) The group policy's date of termination was February 28, 1970. (R-61).
It is patent from the foregoing that even if decedent were
actively employed by his father from the time decedent's
coverage commenced until the termination date of the pol-
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icy, he would not have been continuously insured for the
requisite five year period. As a result, he was not entitled
to convert to an individual insurance policy and the policy
issued him was void.
Finally, Section 16 only confers a conversion right to
"persons." A "person" is described in the group policy as
one "actively employed." (R-46). The minimum 15 hour
work week requirement for one to be "actively employed"
has already been mentioned. If decedent did not work for
his father sufficiently to become an active employee, he had
no right to convert, and, indeed, no vight at all to coverage
under the group policy.
There is no suggestion whatever in the record that
decedent ever worked fifteen hours per week for his father
during the year of 1970. His father testified that during
the first half of 1970, from January until the decedent's
death, the decedent's work hours for his father would vary
from zero to twelve hours per week. (Norman Cragun
Dep. 5/5/70, p. 7). The father specifically testified that he
could not recall any week when the dece-dent worked more
than twelve hours a week in the first half of 1970. (Id. at
p. 8). From the foregoing it seems clear to respondent that
decedent was never an "active employee" entitled to coverage. And if he was not an "active employee," he was entitled to neither coverage nor conversion privileges under
the Group Policy.
The group policy did contain a one year incontestability
clause (R-47). However, respondent respectfully contends
that that clause does not preclude respondent from raising
the question of the decedent's status as an "active employ-
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ee." Respondent contends that the decedent's application
for conversion (R-44) and decedent's letter to respondent
(R-43) re-represented, at least implicitly, that decedent
was an active employee pursuant to the requirements of the
group policy. This later representation constituted a renewed statement of fosurability under the group policy and
this later representation started a re-running of the incontestability period. Since the individual policy insuring decedent was rescinded within one year from its inception,
the incontestability provision does not bar respondent's
claim.
However, even if there was no re-representation by
decedent of his active employment status, the incontestability provision does not bar a group insurer from claiming
that decedent was not an employee and, therefore, not entitled to coverage. Although there appear to be no Utah
cases in point, there is persuasive authority in other jurisdictions stating that where a group policy limits coverage
to employees of a group policy holder, the insurer may raise
the claim that a person is not an employee even after the
policy's incontestability period has expired.
In Fisher v. Prudent'ial Insurance Co., 107 N. H. 101,
218 A.2d 62 (1966) decedent's representative sought to recover benefits allegedly owing to deceased under a group
health insurance policy. It appeared in that case that the
deceased was enrolled in a group policy and premiums for
he-r coverage were paid. The decedent was never, however,
an employee within the language of the group policy, and
even though the incontestibility time had expired, the insurer was held to be able to deny benefit payments because
the deceased was never an employee.

',
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The Supreme Court of New Hampshire cited with approval the language of a federal court in Fisher v. United
States Life Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 879, 882 (4th Cir. 1957):
[T]he incontestable clause, after the passage of the
stipulated period, proscribes defenses which go to the
validity of the policy whether because of noncompliance with conditions or the falsity of representations
or warranties. It was never intended to enlarge the
coverage of the policy, to compel an insurance company
to insure lives it never intended to cover or to accept
risks or hazards clearly excluded by the terms of the
policy. Fisher v. Prudential, supra, at 65.
The Court in Fisher v. Prudential also cited with approval a New York Court of Appeals decision in MetropoUtan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 452, 169 N. E.
642 (1930) (Cardozo, Chief Judge):
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after
it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured
for a period of two years is not a mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the
insurer. It means only this, "that within the limits of
the coverage the policy [will] stand, unaffected by any
defense that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken.
Fisher v. P?'Udential, supra, at 65.
In Spitz v. Continental Casualty Co., 40 Wis. 2d 439,
162 N. W. 2d 1 (1968) plaintiff claimed to be entitled to
benefits of a group policy, but the defendant, insurer,
counterclaimed for rescission of the policy because the
plaintiff was not an eligible member. It appeared that the
incontestability time had expired. The trial court granted
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defendant's motion for summary judgment and the state
supreme court affirmed holding:
Appellant contends that the incontestability clause in
the insurance policy precludes the insurance carrier
from contesting the right of the doctor to recover
under the policy. However, the incontestability clause
by its terms applies only to statements of insureds who
are "eligible for coverage under the policy." The requirement of eligibility is the threshold that ,:must be
crossed before we reach the question of representations, misrepresentations or posssible fraud. In a
group policy one's status as an eligible member of the
group is the exact basis on which the company offers
the policy. One must come within the definition of a
member of the group to qualify for coverage. While a
misrepresentation as to eligibility for coverage might
also increase the risk or contribute to the loss, it is
under a group policy something more than a mere
statement relating to insurability. It is a certification
to status as one eligible to coverage as a member of
the group involved. 162 N. W. 2d at 2-3. (Emphasis
Added).
And finally in upholding the position of a group insurer, a federal court of appeals noted, with respect to facts
closely analagous to those now before this court:
Additionally, it is important, in construing the facts
in this case, to note that the provision that all of the
employees work regularly thirty hours per week is
not a static situation, but one which has continuity
to it, for, assuming that no question of waiver was
involved, can it be seriously contended that after one
year, if it came to the attention of the defendant for
the first time that some of the group had been working
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only two hours a week, or had left the employ of the
company, a month after the policy had become effective, the defendant could not cancel the policy, or if
death ensued, it could not assert it as a defense'! Additionally, if it came to the attention of the defendant
any time after the one year period that any of the
group were not working thirty hours a week, it would
be most unrealistic to hold that the company could not
cancel the policy as to such person or, in the event of
death, assert it as a defense to a beneficiary's claim
for, if it were otherwise, the defendant would be required to police every member of the group continually
to see if they were working thirty hours a week. ObViously, the contract provision itself vitiates any assertion here of the incontestability clause. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co. v. United States Life
Insurance Co., 421 F.2d 959, 963 (3rd Cir. 1969).
(Emphasis Added).
In summation, decedent did not terminate his employment on February 28, 1970; he was not continuously insured
for the requisite five year period and he was not an "active
employee" or "actively employed" within the meaning of the
Group Policy. Since he was therefore ineligible to convert
the individual insurance policy issued to him, the individual
insurance policy was entitled to be rescinded by the defendant-respondent.
On the basis of all the foregoing, respondent respectfully contends that the trial court correctly granted defendant-respondent's motion for summary judgment.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
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In answering plaintiff's amended complaint, defendant
raised several defenses including the following:
1. Section 16 of the Group Policy would preclude
Ronald N. Cragun from converting more than the amount of
insurance in force on his life ( $5,000.00) if the conversion
was based upon the termination of his employment. Section
16 of the Group Policy would preclude Ronald N. Cragun
from converting to any amount of insurance if based upon
termination of the Group Policy since at the time of termination of said policy he had been insured under the Group
Policy for less than the required five years prior thereto.

2. If Ronald N. Cragun was ever the employee of Cragun Music Company he did not terminate on February 28,
1970 contrary to his representations to that effect.
3. The Group Policy provided that it was only effective
in favor of those persons who were actively at work and
further defined "actively at work" as "active full time performance of all customary duties of his occupation (for a
period of at least 15 hours per week) at his usual place of
employment." Ronald N. Cragun was never "actively at
work" as required by the Group Policy and there being no
valid coverage under the Group Policy there could be no
right to conversion thereof and the subsequent policy issued
by the defendant based upon the misrepresentation that he
had been "actively at work" is void.
4. If Ronald N. Cragun was ever an employee of Cragun Music Company as contemplated by the Group Policy
he ceased to be "actively at work" as required by the Group
Policy and his conversion rights, if any, had expired prior
to any attempt on his part to exercise the same.
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5. Ronald N. Cragun misrepresented that under the
Group Policy he had in effect $10,000.00 of life insurance
when in fact there could only have been $5,000.00, if any.
That therefore the policy should be voided or if not voided,
reformed.
Said defenses raise substantial issues of law and fact
and are supported by the uncontroverted evidence. It would
have been improper for the Court to rule summarily in favor
of the plaintiff. As was stated in Eklund v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, 89 Utah 273, 57 P.2d 362 (1936).
The respondent was justified in its refusal to pay
the policies. The evidence that the policies were obtained by misrepresentation being uncontradicted and
it being possible to draw only one inference from it,
there was presented a question of law for the court and
not a question of fact for the jury. Id at 283-284, 57
P.2d at 367.
CONCLUSION
The District Court concluded as a matter of law that
the decedent was not eligible to be insured under the Group
Policy and therefore had no privilege or right to convert.
The decedent misrepresented that he was eligible to
be insured and was insured for $10,000.00 under the Group
Policy.
Insurability was not a question in issuing a new policy.
If decedent was insured under the Group Policy the defendant-respondent had a contractual obligation to convert his
insurance on his timely application whether he was insurable or not.
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The policy issued to a person who was not eligible and
in an amount to which he would not have been entitled if
eligible was properly rescinded by the defendant and the
District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. M. Child and
James L. Wilde of
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
Attorneys for Defendant

and Respondent

